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When Is a Preannounced New 
Product Likely to Be Delayed? 
Consider that a firm announces a deadline for a new product introduction. Conditional on such a preannouncement, 
how must an external observer evaluate whether the product will be delayed beyond that deadline? Using data col- 
lected from managers in the computer hardware, software, and telecommunications industries, the authors present 
an analysis that demonstrates that delays in new product introductions beyond preannounced deadlines can be 
jointly explained by factors related to (1) the firm's motivations to delay the product, (2) the presence of constraints 
that prevent delay (or the availability of opportunities to delay the product), and (3) the firm's abilities pertaining to 
product development. 
A 
new product preannouncement (NPPA) is a formal, 
deliberate communication that releases information 
about a product well in advance of the product's 
actual introduction (Eliashberg and Robertson 1988; Koku 
1998). Preannounced products are often delayed, particu- 
larly in technology-intensive industries. For example, as 
many as 47% of 123 key software products that were 
announced before introduction during 1985-1995 were 
delayed by more than three months (Bayus, Jain, and Rao 
2001). According to the Standish Group's 1995 survey of 
8000 U.S.-based software projects, 84% did not finish on 
time, on budget, or with all features installed (Hoch et al. 
2000). Furthermore, more than 30% of the projects were 
cancelled before completion. 
When a product is preannounced, delays in introduction 
can cause a slew of problems for partner firms and cus- 
tomers. Delays can also hurt the announcing firm. Hen- 
dricks and Singhal (1997) study 101 firms that did not meet 
product introduction deadlines and find that delay 
announcements, on average, decreased the firms' market 
value by 5.25% (or, equivalently, by a substantial $119.3 
million, measured in 1991 dollars). 
However, NPPAs can also be beneficial: They can adver- 
tise a firm's presence at the cutting edge of technology, enable 
customers and partners to prepare for the product, and provide 
information to the stock market. Preannouncements can also 
promote social welfare and increase competition (Fisher, 
McGowan, and Greenwood 1983; Landis and Rolfe 1985). 
The phenomenon of product introduction delays beyond 
preannounced deadlines has attracted attention across man- 
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agerial, research, and policy arenas. The following question 
is of particular interest: From the perspective of an observer 
outside the preannouncing firm (e.g., a customer, a manager 
in a firm that is a competitor or a partner/complementor), 
how should a preannounced product introduction deadline 
be evaluated? After all, talk is cheap. 
The literature lacks a systematic empirical analysis of 
the factors that lead to delays in the introduction of prean- 
nounced products; this article addresses the corresponding 
knowledge gap. Adopting the perspective of an outside 
observer who has the task of evaluating an NPPA, we theo- 
retically motivate and empirically validate a framework that 
explains delays in NPPA fulfillment. a ante, such an 
accounting can help the outside observer arrive at more 
informed, better-reasoned conclusions about specific 
NPPAs. Ex post, such an accounting can facilitate a richer 
interpretation of a delay that has already occurred. 
In constructing the framework, we draw from the 
motivation-opportunity-ability (MOA) paradigm that has 
been employed in other contexts (e.g., Heer and Poiesz 1998; 
MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991). We demonstrate 
that a robust accounting for product delays beyond the pre- 
announced introduction date must incorporate explanatory 
variables related to motivation (i.e., whether the managers in 
the firm want to introduce the product on time), opportunity 
(i.e., whether certain forces constrain managers from delay- 
ing the product), and ability (i.e., whether the firm and its 
managers are capable of introducing the product on time). 
We do not focus here on either the motivations for prean- 
nouncements or the decisions regarding the lead time to prod- 
uct introduction (i.e., the length of time between the date of 
the preannouncement and the promised introduction date). 
Rather, our focus is on explaining product-launch delay 
beyond the preannounced deadline, conditional on the prean- 
nouncement being made. This approach is particularly appro- 
priate from our adopted perspective of the outside observer. 
We first synthesize existing perspectives about NPPAs 
and then present a conceptual framework and describe the 
survey methodology. We subsequently discuss the empirical 
findings and the limitations of our study. 
Background 
Researchers across disciplines have studied issues related to 
NPPAs; for example, the issue of whether a firm should pre- 
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announce has been considered from both analytical (Farrell 
and Saloner 1986) and empirical (Eliashberg and Robertson 
1988) perspectives. Farrell and Saloner (1986) argue that 
NPPAs can halt competitive momentum in network-based 
markets. Eliashberg and Robertson (1988) enrich this per- 
spective by establishing detailed conditions that guide the 
NPPA decision. For example, they demonstrate that large 
firms may hold back from NPPAs on account of antitrust 
concerns and potentially significant cannibalization of exist- 
ing products. Strategic motivations may drive the NPPAs of 
yet other firms; the credibility of the preannouncements may 
depend on the presence or absence of a credible threat to 
entry (Desai and Srinivasan 1994), the existing reputation of 
the announcing firm (Levy 1995), and the development 
costs of the announcing firm (Bayus, Jain, and Rao 2001). 
If a firm preannounces, when should it do so? Lilly and 
Walters (1997) and Kohli (1999) examine this issue of 
NPPA timing by providing a propositional inventory that 
describes how factors related to competitors, products, buy- 
ers, and the preannouncing firm can influence such timing. 
Kohli empirically illustrates how purchase patterns, cus- 
tomer learning needs, and expected competitive reactions 
influence such timing. 
Finally, what are the effects of NPPAs and the implica- 
tions of not living up to them? In this context, Robertson, 
Eliashberg, and Rymon (1995) examine the likelihood, 
aggressiveness, and path of a firm's reaction to a competi- 
tor's NPPA. In addition to demarcating a range of industry- 
and signal-related factors that guide such reaction (e.g., the 
firm's commitment to the product category, available patent 
protection), Robertson, Eliashberg, and Rymon find that 
firms may respond to NPPAs that use marketing-mix instru- 
ments other than the product itself. Koku (1998) examines 
stock market reactions to NPPAs and finds that the stock 
market reacts positively to new product announcements 
accompanied by detailed information releases rather than 
NPPAs. Hendricks and Singhal (1997) determine that not 
living up to NPPAs can erode market capital.1 
The existing literature provides insights into the exis- 
tence, nature, and effects of NPPAs. However, from the per- 
spective of an outside observer, a systematic examination of 
factors that may cause a new product to be delayed beyond 
the preannounced deadline is missing in the literature. 
Research on this issue represents a logical extension of 
existing work in the area. 
Conceptual Framework 
Multiple factors can cause a product to be delayed beyond a 
preannounced deadline. First, research on new product 
development has focused on how the lack of firm-level abil- 
ities can delay product introductions. These studies have 
highlighted the role of technical problems related to design 
and development, poor management of the development 
process, and the lack of resources and senior management 
support. Suggested remedial measures include the imple- 
1Heil and Walters (1993) use a signaling framework (e.g., Heil 
and Robertson 1991; Spence 1974) to examine incumbent reac- 
tions to new product introductions (rather than to NPPAs). 
mentation of cross-functional teams and concurrent engi- 
neering and the allocation of adequate managerial resources 
toward development (e.g., Cooper 1995; Gupta and Wile- 
mon 1990; Hendricks and Singhal 1997). The firm's internal 
capabilities play an important role in determining whether a 
firm conforms to a preannounced deadline; however, they 
provide only a partial accounting of delays, particularly 
when the introduction has been preannounced. 
Irrespective of a firm's ability to introduce a product on 
time, it may be motivated to delay a preannounced product. 
For example, the NPPA may be designed to preempt or 
respond quickly to a competitor's initiative. In such cases, 
the NPPA may aim more to prevent customer defection in 
the short run by promising an upgraded product in the near 
future. When the threat from the competitor has been suc- 
cessfully eliminated, the incentive to introduce the product 
on time is diluted. 
Finally, even when a firm is motivated to delay product 
introduction beyond a preannounced deadline, the firm's 
key customers and partners, who may be adversely affected 
by such delays, may constrain the firm to introduce the 
product on time (i.e., pressure from these entities may shrink 
the opportunity for delay). These entities often schedule 
their own activities and initiatives on the basis of the expec- 
tations set up by the preannouncement. Consequently, from 
their perspective, delays beyond preannounced deadlines 
can be inconvenient and expensive. 
Taken together, these arguments suggest that any expla- 
nation of delays in the introduction of preannounced prod- 
ucts must accommodate the announcing firm's ability to 
introduce the product on time, its motivations to delay the 
product, and the presence or absence of opportunities to 
delay the product. Such MOA triads have been applied in 
the consumer behavior literature to study how consumers 
process information (Andrews 1988; Batra and Ray 1986; 
Heer and Poiesz 1998; MacInnis and Jaworski 1989; MacIn- 
nis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991). The motivation-ability 
framework has also been applied in the marketing and strat- 
egy literature to study organizational behaviors (e.g., Chen 
and Hambrick 1995; Grewal 2001). 
We selected specific constructs related to the framework 
as follows: We began with a large set of variables based on 
the existing literature on product delays in general, and we 
then winnowed down the list to focus on a smaller set of 
salient variables. We achieved this refinement in two ways. 
First, we examined the literature thoroughly to identify and 
include constructs that were particularly salient for prean- 
nounced products. Second, we conducted in-depth, in- 
person interviews with eight managers from firms across the 
computer hardware, software, and telecommunications 
industries. The interviews provided a practical perspective 
on product delays in the context of NPPAs and helped us 
demarcate key constructs related to the announcing firm's 
motivations, opportunities, and abilities. Figure 1 describes 
the resulting conceptual framework. 
Note that some of the antecedent variables in Figure 1 
may influence (1) the time to actual launch from the date of 
the preannouncement (e.g., t1) and (2) the preannouncement 
lead time (i.e., the gap between the date the preannounce- 
ment is made and the promised product introduction date; 
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e.g.,t2). The difference between the two time durations (t1 
t2) constitutes the product introduction delay, which may be 
negative if the product is launched before the preannounced 
deadline. Figure 1 thus presents what may be considered a 
reduced-form model that is particularly relevant from an 
outside observer's perspective, because such an observer can 
evaluate an NPPA only after the introduction deadline is 
announced. Stated differently, we treat the preannounce- 
ment date as exogenously determined.2 
Factors Related to Motivation 
Competitive objectives. Firms frequently employ NPPAs 
to communicate plans for a retaliatory move against a com- 
petitor and to preempt competitive entry (Rabin and Moore 
1989). Kohli (1999) notes that approximately 25% of the 
preannouncements in his study were made in response to a 
competitor's announcement or product introduction. Such 
NPPAs can deliver significant competitive advantages (e.g., 
IBM's NPPA about its disk-drive system for storing data on 
mainframe computers flattened the sales of the industry 
leader EMC) (Lahr 1994). 
A new product is likely to be delayed when it is prean- 
nounced with competitive objectives. For an NPPA to hinder 
the momentum of a competitor's product, it must be com- 
municated shortly before or after the competitor's own 
announcement or introduction. In a firm's haste to act, it may 
communicate either a new product concept that is at an early 
stage of development or plans for a product that has not yet 
been conceived in sufficient detail.3 In each case, there is ten- 
sion between high levels of uncertainty and the need to con- 
vince the market immediately that the firm will have a com- 
petitive offering available in the near future. Furthermore, 
announcements made in reaction to those of competitors are 
more likely to be "smoke," that is, designed expressly to fore- 
stall any deleterious defection of customers and partners 
while the firm considers a more deliberate response. 
Even if a new product preannounced in a preemptive or 
reactive context has been under sustained development, it 
may need major changes to match or exceed the competi- 
tor's announced or introduced offering. Consequently, mar- 
ket introduction may be delayed. On the basis of these argu- 
ments, we propose the the 
H1: As the degree to which a firm uses an NPPA as a compet- 
itive tool to preempt or react to a competitor's move 
increases, the delay in introducing the preannounced prod- 
uct increases. 
Controlling cannibalization. New product sales can 
come from market expansion (i.e., demand stimulation), 
sales of competing products, or cannibalization of sales of 
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for this interpretation. 
3For example, consider Airbus's NPPA about its double-decker 
555-seat A3XX jetliner. The A3XX was to compete with Boeing's 
747-400 Jumbo, which dominates the long-range, large-carrier 
market. Boeing responded by preannouncing a 747X Stretch ver- 
sion with a lengthened upper-deck hump, sleeping berths over 
coach class, and high-quality in-seat entertainment. Boeing then 
withdrew the plans for the 747X in favor of a smaller, near super- 
sonic passenger aircraft: the Sonic Cruiser. Plans for this plane, 
too, are now on hold. 
FIGURE 1
Explaining Product Introduction Delays Beyond 
Preannounced Deadlines: An MOA Framework 
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Top manaaement emphasis 
the firm's existing products (Kohli 1999). When a new prod- 
uct is expected to cannibalize the sales of existing products, 
customers may wait for the preannounced product rather 
than purchase existing offerings. This can reduce cash 
inflow, thereby placing the firm in a dire financial situation. 
The willingness to cannibalize existing products or orga- 
nizational routines has sometimes been viewed as a desir- 
able trait that promotes radical product innovation and long- 
term corporate success (e.g., Chandy and Tellis 1998; 
Copulsky 1976; Kerin, Harvey, and Rothe 1978). In such 
cases, firms must carefully plan for cannibalization after 
taking multiple factors into account, including the difference 
in the profit margins of the old and new products. 
In general, though, the fear of cannibalization can disci- 
pline firm behavior with respect to NPPAs. The fear of can- 
nibalization can discourage a firm from even undertaking 
NPPAs (Eliashberg and Robertson 1988). Furthermore, in 
designing NPPAs, firms that fear cannibalization may 
ensure that the time between the NPPA and the proposed 
product introduction deadline is not substantial (Kohli 1999; 
Lilly and Walters 1997). Finally, when a firm has prean- 
nounced, it may believe that it is pressured to meet the pre- 
announced deadline to avoid a situation in which consumers 
waiting for the product continue to postpone purchases, 
thereby constricting the firm's cash flow. For example, 
Osborne Computer released a premature NPPA for its next- 
generation computer; the NPPA dried out cash inflow from 
existing computer lines and led Osborne to file for bank- 
ruptcy (Casselman 1991). On the basis of these arguments, 
we propose the following: 
H2: As the potential for cannibalization of the announcing 
firm's existing products increases, the delay in introducing 
the preannounced product decreases. 
Factors Related to Opportunity 
Market dominance. Dominant firms are held to higher 
corporate standards, and they value positive public relations 
and their reputation as important assets. A dominant firm's 
delayed product introduction is likely to have strong impacts 
on customers and partners/complementors. The resulting 
criticism can damage the reputation of the dominant firm. 
Market dominance 
Partner cower 
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Dominant firms with significantly delayed products are 
also more likely to attract antitrust attention from the Fed- 
eral Trade Commission and other regulators.4 For firms such 
as IBM and Microsoft, such legal entanglements can absorb 
precious resources, including managerial attention, and can 
adversely affect their leadership and innovativeness. Con- 
sider this description of IBM's predicament during the early 
1970s, when government litigation against the firm was at 
its height: "At IBM, people got afraid to move. They were 
afraid to take risks" (BBC News 1999). Likewise, Nicholas 
Katzenbach, the former U.S. attorney general who led 
IBM's defense, noted that during the 1970s, senior execu- 
tives at IBM carried two briefcases, "one for company busi- 
ness and one for the lawsuit" (BBC News 1999). 
The immediate effects of NPPAs may well be stronger for 
dominant firms. A dominant firm's NPPAs can effectively 
evoke consumers' fears, uncertainties, and doubts and can 
slow the momentum of a popular rival product (Johnston 
1995). However, significant delays in product introduction 
can hurt the dominant firm's strategic position in the long run, 
because the only way a firm can trick the marketplace and get 
away with delayed products in the short run is by cashing in 
on some of its existing (good) reputation (Levy 1995). 
Finally, there is empirical support for the notion that 
dominant firms tend to be conservative and to conform to 
the rules in the context of product introduction. For exam- 
ple, large firms are less likely to broadcast NPPAs because 
they are sensitive to potential antitrust action on account of 
"market overhanging" (i.e., preannouncing a product far in 
advance, with the deliberate intent of injuring competitors' 
sales) (Eliashberg and Robertson 1988). Likewise, it has 
been established that significant product introduction delays 
(three months and more) are negatively and significantly 
related to firm size (Bayus, Jain, and Rao 2001). On the 
basis of these arguments, we propose the following: 
H3: As the market dominance of an announcing firm increases, 
the delay in introducing the preannounced product 
decreases. 
Partner power. Partner power refers to the degree to 
which partners can penalize the offender when an NPPA 
deadline is not fulfilled. Such punishment can include nega- 
tive word of mouth, reduced cooperation, and even termina- 
tion of the relationship. 
Delayed product introductions are particularly harmful 
for the firm's partners in high-technology industries. When 
changes in technology are rapid and product life cycles are 
short, complementary products from partners are often 
developed in parallel with the focal product and are based on 
the projected timing and features of the focal product. The 
NPPAs can encourage partners to undertake the risks 
4The ruling of Judge Stanley Sporkin in Civil Action No. 94- 
1564 (United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation 1995, 
s V.B.3) offers evidence of a dominant firm being scrutinized for 
the practice of aggressive preannouncement: "Microsoft has a 
dominant position in the operating systems market, from which the 
[g]overnment's expert concedes it would be very hard to dislodge 
it. Given this fact, Microsoft could unfairly hold onto this position 
with aggressive preannouncements of new products in the face of 
the introduction of possibly superior competitive products." 
involved with such concurrent development. When the pre- 
announced product is delayed, the expected cash flows of 
partner firms may not materialize, because their products 
may not have independent markets. For example, when an 
operating system is late, application software developers 
may need to stretch budgets for 6 to 18 months or even aban- 
don projects altogether (Scannell and Johnston 1994). The 
systems integrator and Sun Microsystems reseller DigiNet 
ceased operations partly because of the inability of Sun's 
Java programming language to deliver on its promises in a 
timely manner (Gage and Foley 1998). 
Complementary products' added value to the focal prod- 
uct can endow partners with the potential ability to punish 
the offending focal-product producer; however, that ability 
is likely to be moderated by the differential distribution of 
power and mutual dependence of the parties. This ability to 
punish is curtailed when (1) the market for complementary 
products is competitive, (2) the partners are relatively small, 
(3) there are few other ways to get to market apart from 
associating with the focal product, and/or (4) the partners 
have incurred substantial fixed costs specific to the focal- 
product producer. In such cases, the focal-product producers 
are less likely to live up to their commitments; however, in 
other cases, the partners may wield significant influence 
over the announcing firm. For example, the influence of 
partners may be enhanced when the relationship between 
the announcing firm and its partners is guided by strong 
relational norms that curtail opportunistic behavior (Heide 
and John 1992). In other cases, the announcing firm may 
itself be tightly linked to its partners through either idiosyn- 
cratic investments that are difficult to deploy in other rela- 
tionships or contractual terms that constrain activities 
related to that relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1992). In 
these conditions, the adverse consequences of delaying the 
product are likely to be significant, and the announcing firm 
will try to meet preannounced deadlines.5 On the basis of 
these arguments, we propose the following: 
I-14: As partner power increases, the delay in introducing the 
preannounced product decreases. 
Factors Related to Ability 
Product innovativeness. Product innovativeness reflects 
the degree to which new technology and advanced features 
are embedded in a product. Two innovation dimensions are 
relevant here: the technology dimension and the market/cus- 
tomer dimension (Abernathy and Clark 1985; Chandy and 
Tellis 1998). 
Product innovativeness increases uncertainty in the 
product development and marketing contexts and can delay 
product introduction. First, in the development context, 
innovative products are associated with increased techno- 
logical risk (i.e., the firm may not be able to effectively 
design and efficiently manufacture the product). To control 
technological risk, firms need to sequence and carefully 
manage complex development processes, but this can be a 
challenging task (Krishnan, Eppinger, and Whitney 1997). 
5Although we initially included customer power as an explana- 
tory variable in the model, we dropped it on account of measure- 
ment problems. 
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In addition, firms may reduce technological risk by design- 
ing and rigorously testing new product platforms, seeking 
new technology partners, and building new knowledge 
related to the product. These initiatives can take consider- 
able and unpredictable amounts of time. Therefore, 
increased technology uncertainty can prolong development 
and delay the product beyond the promised deadline. 
Second, innovative products are associated with 
increased market risk (the risk that the product may not find 
market acceptance even after successful design and manu- 
facture). Firms typically preannounce innovative products 
early to advance consumer learning (Eliashberg and Robert- 
son 1988) and to build a sense of familiarity that diminishes 
resistance to the unknown and unfamiliar (Lilly and Walters 
1997). Although preannouncement of an innovative product 
may help prepare the marketplace for change, it is fre- 
quently difficult to control the pace of the development 
process and, accordingly, to predict the product's introduc- 
tion date with confidence. Given that uncertainty is gradu- 
ally clarified as the firm progresses through the development 
process, deadlines promised in NPPAs for innovative prod- 
ucts are more likely not to be fulfilled. On the basis of these 
arguments, we propose the following: 
H5: As the innovativeness of the preannounced product 
increases, the delay in introducing the preannounced prod- 
uct increases. 
Interfunctional coordination. Interfunctional coordina- 
tion refers to the extent to which the work activities of dif- 
ferent functions are logically consistent, coherent, and 
mutually coordinated with respect to preestablished perfor- 
mance objectives (Cheng 1983; Wood and Tandon 1994). 
Interfunctional coordination has been associated with 
greater new product success and a stronger market orienta- 
tion (Cooper 1984; Kohli and Jaworski 1990). 
New products are frequently delayed by a lack of coor- 
dination both among members of the core product develop- 
ment team and between the product team and functional 
areas such as marketing and manufacturing (Jenkins 1988). 
Product teams often accuse functional areas of being 
overoptimistic about development outcomes and timelines 
and of disseminating news without careful consultation with 
developers (Kay 1992). Kay (1992) cites the example of 
Monarch Computer, which promised its textile industry cus- 
tomers a six-month delivery time frame for a new knitting 
machine. The director of software development noted, "they 
were only concerned with selling the machine itself, and it 
didn't even occur to them that it may be difficult to write the 
(software) system that drives the machine within the six 
months" (Kay 1992, p. 81). However, management and mar- 
keting had their sides of the story as well. They complained 
that developers kept working on the product until they were 
completely satisfied, without realizing the urgency of intro- 
ducing a product on time to beat competition. 
Cross-functional teams are increasingly used in new 
product development. The members of such teams have col- 
lective knowledge that cannot be effectively held by indi- 
vidual members; therefore, coordination is crucial if the 
embedded knowledge possessed by team members is to be 
translated into embodied knowledge that is resident in the 
product (Madhavan and Grover 1998). Cross-functional 
product development teams can support timely product 
introductions (Cooper 1995); however, for such teams to 
work well, effective interfunctional coordination is required. 
On the basis of these arguments, we propose the following: 
H6: As the interfunctional coordination in the firm increases, 
the delay in introducing the preannounced product 
decreases. 
Top management emphasis. Top management shapes an 
organization's values (Kohli and Jaworski 1990), and its 
emphasis on timely product introduction can influence the 
attitudes of lower-level managers toward delay in product 
launch. If top management believes that a delay in introduc- 
ing a preannounced product is a mistake that the firm does 
not want and cannot afford to make, that message would 
influence the entire product development process, including 
decisions related to NPPAs. Living up to public commit- 
ments would then be a priority for the firm. 
Senior managers at many firms work to define and 
improve the product development process. At EDS, Dick 
Brown, the chief executive officer, who inculcated a culture of 
living up to internal and external commitments, noted: "It's 
easier to miss a budget than a commitment, because a budget 
is just an accumulation of numbers. A commitment is your 
personal pledge to get the job done. And that's how we strive 
to behave as a team" (Fast Company 2001, p. 106). At EDS, 
the company's leaders know exactly when a client's expecta- 
tions are not being met. At another consumer product firm, 
top management established an informal but widely known 
two-year deadline for bringing new products to market. Man- 
agers who consistently met these deadlines were promoted.6 
When top management sets an appropriate tone, lower- 
level managers strive to introduce the preannounced product 
in a timely manner. On the basis of these arguments, we pro- 
pose the following: 
H7: As top management's emphasis on delivering a prean- 
nounced product on time increases, the delay in introduc- 
ing the preannounced product decreases. 
Methodology 
Data Collection 
The unit of analysis is an NPPA in the computer hardware, 
software, and telecommunications industries. These indus- 
tries preannounce new products more often than other indus- 
tries. Furthermore, the focus on a limited set of industries 
ensures sufficient within-sample consistency. Product devel- 
opment processes and environmental factors vary widely 
across industries; thus, if we studied disparate industries, we 
would need to control for the substantial variances. Our 
focus on a set of allied industries reduces the generality of 
the results to an extent; however, we are reasonably assured 
that the broad parameters related to development processes 
and the competitive environment are consistent across the 
studied firms. This enhances our confidence in the results. 
6We thank Abbie Griffin for suggesting this example. 
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As a first step, we conducted in-depth, in-person inter- 
views with eight managers from firms across the chosen 
industries. The interviews provided a practical perspective 
on NPPAs and product delays and helped segregate the 
antecedents of greatest importance. We acquired a list of 
potential respondents, including senior marketing execu- 
tives in the industries, from CorpTech. We restricted partic- 
ipants to strategic business units (SBUs) with 250 or more 
employees. This ensured, by design, that we did not include 
small divisions in the surveys, which further enhances the 
comparability of results. The sampling frame covered 1252 
potential respondents. 
Following previous work in the area (e.g., Eliashberg 
and Robertson 1988; Kohli 1999; Robertson, Eliashberg, 
and Rymon 1995), we used key informant reports as the 
source for data. Typically, the head of marketing was the key 
informant. Most potential respondents (more than 80%) 
were at the level of director or higher. The questionnaire also 
requested a self-report of the respondent's level of knowl- 
edge about the NPPA activities of their SBU. The sample 
reported a high average score of 6.4 on a seven-point scale. 
Thus, we are reasonably confident that the respondents were 
able to comment authoritatively on the issues of interest. 
The survey and a personalized cover letter were mailed 
to potential respondents. We assured potential respondents 
that their identities would remain anonymous and that we 
would only report aggregated results. Approximately ten 
days later, the first reminder letter was mailed. Approxi- 
mately five weeks after the first copy of the survey was 
mailed, the second reminder letter and a new copy of the 
survey were mailed to nonrespondents. The projected incen- 
tive for completing the survey was that the research project 
would help advance managerial knowledge and guide man- 
agerial initiatives related to NPPAs; we also promised 
respondents a copy of the tabulated results, aggregated to 
ensure that respondents could not be identified. From 1252 
mailings, 26 were returned because of inaccurate addresses 
or absence of the addressees, which reduced the frame to 
1226. A total of 201 surveys were returned, for an overall 
response rate of 16.4%. Among the 201 returned surveys, 82 
had no NPPAs in the past two years, and 6 were unusable 
because of missing input. Thus, we used data from 113 
respondents for the final analysis. 
This response rate is reasonable, and even encouraging, 
for the following reasons: First, the survey covered ques- 
tions about the SBUs' NPPAs and product-delay times. In 
general, answers to these questions are confidential and/or 
sensitive. Second, the targeted respondents were typically 
heads of the marketing function (marketing vice presidents 
or marketing directors), who usually operate under signifi- 
cant time constraints (Calantone and Schatzel 2000). 
To check for response bias, we classified the data into 
two groups on the basis of survey-return dates. We classified 
responses received before six weeks from the first mailing 
date as early responses (n = 80) and those we received later 
as late responses (n = 33). We compared response means for 
the dependent and the explanatory variables across early and 
late respondents; with the exception of the partner-power 
construct, the means were statistically indistinguishable (p < 
.1), suggesting the absence of any significant response bias. 
Consequently, we pooled the data for further analysis. 
Measurement 
We asked respondents to provide extensive data for the most 
recent NPPA in the previous two years. The dependent vari- 
able measures the length of delay in the introduction of a 
preannounced product, which is the difference between the 
product introduction date specified in the preannouncement 
and the actual introduction date. To measure the dependent 
variable, we asked respondents to provide information about 
whether the product was delayed beyond the preannounced 
introduction date. If a delay did occur, we asked respondents 
to report the length of delay beyond the preannounced dead- 
line (in weeks). 
We generated items for measuring the independent vari- 
ables on the basis of the existing literature, field interviews 
with eight managers, and the theoretical antecedents to the 
proposed hypotheses. Whenever possible, we used scales 
from the existing literature; however, we specifically con- 
structed some scales for this study. We pretested the items in 
several steps. First, several doctoral students reviewed the 
items for content and readability. Second, six academic 
experts critically evaluated the items. Finally, eight man- 
agers who were knowledgeable in NPPA activities provided 
feedback. We modified items on the basis of feedback from 
the different sources. 
We established the reliability and validity of the mea- 
sures using the standard procedure that Gerbing and Ander- 
son (1988) recommend. We performed a Varimax-rotated 
principle component analysis to investigate the unidimen- 
sionality of each construct. We deleted items with signifi- 
cant cross-loadings. The results are displayed in Table 1: 
Note that despite the relatively large number of constructs, 
there is a clean separation between the resulting seven fac- 
tors (we did not prespecify the number of factors). Because 
of the size of the sample (n = 113), we did not conduct con- 
firmatory factor analysis. Nonconvergence and improper 
solutions are likely to occur when sample sizes are smaller 
than 150 (Gerbing and Anderson 1988). 
The specific items used, their sources, and the Cronbach 
alphas associated with their respective scales are detailed in 
Appendix A. All the included items demonstrated acceptable 
item-to-total correlations. The alphas for all scales compare 
favorably with the .7-and-greater criterion that Nunnally 
(1978) suggests, except for the scale that measures partner 
power. At .67, Cronbach's alpha for this scale is close to Nun- 
nally's criterion. There are some limitations to our scales, par- 
ticularly the new ones we developed for this study: We expect 
that they will be expanded and refined in further research. 
Analysis and Results 
Approximately 70% of respondents encountered some delay 
in introducing preannounced products. For delayed prod- 
ucts, the average delay was 9.3 weeks (minimum 1 week 
and maximum 52 weeks). These findings are broadly con- 
sistent with those of Kohli (1999). 
For a firm that introduces the product on time, the 
dependent variable (i.e., number of weeks the product is 
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TABLE 1 
Rotated Component Matrix of Item Loadings for Independent Variables 
Components 













































































































	-.072 .061 .090 .000 
	.002 -.084 .043 -.025 
	-.015 -.041 -.044 .070 
	-.066 -.122 -.098 .097 
	.104 .023 -.091 .060 
	-.008 .042 .050 -.131 
085 .311 .281 .025 
	-.094 .126 .051 .192 
	-.214 .131 -.038 -.099 
	.874 .071 -.124 -.043 
	.788 -.149 -.124 -.095 
	-.076 .593 .191 .123 
057 .694 .189 .190 
	-.033 .665 .137 .225 
	-.019 .783 .019 .008 
	-.015 .713 .011 .138 
	-.219 .214 .674 .294 
	-.057 .178 .655 .443 
	-.040 -.010 .688 .240 
	-.076 .157 .733 -.073 
	-.137 .071 .110 .866 
	.193 .099 .238 .777 
	-.101 .283 .041 .709 
	-.010 .057 .117 .827 
	-.202 .448 .262 .585 
Notes: Extraction method is principal component analysis. Rotation method is Varimax with Kaiser normalization. We did not prespecify the 
number of factors. For items, see Appendix A. 
delayed beyond the preannounced deadline) is zero. There- 
fore, the dependent variable is left-censored (i.e., there is a 
mass point at zero representing firms that introduced the 
product on or before the preannounced deadline). In such 
cases, ordinary least squares regression yields estimates that 
are inconsistent and biased toward zero (Judge et al. 1985); 
instead, a Tobit model provides the appropriate estimation 
approach (Tobin 1958). We represented independent vari- 
ables with their average item score. 
Before estimation, we tested the data for multicollinear- 
ity. Diagnostics indicated that the variance inflation factors 
associated with each variable were much less than 2. Fur- 
thermore, none of the condition indexes associated with the 
eigenvalues of the variable matrix was greater than 20. In 
conjunction with the separation of constructs demonstrated 
in Table 1, these tests imply the absence of significant mul- 
ticollinearity problems (Johnston 1991, p. 250). 
An initial estimation that included dummy variables to 
capture potential industry-specific effects revealed no sig- 
nificant variation by industry; thus, we pooled the data for 
the final estimation. For firms with positive delay in product 
introduction, both a visual inspection of the residuals and a 
formal Glesjer test did not signal the presence of significant 
heteroskedasticity (Johnston 1991). We then obtained 
maximum-likelihood estimates using TSP 4.5. We initially 
included two variables (technology uncertainty and market 
uncertainty) to control for the possible influence of the 
dynamic nature of the technological environment and of 
rapid changes in product requirements and/or definition on 
product introduction times. Neither of the variables was sig- 
nificant; thus, we dropped them during the final estimation. 
Results 
Table 2 presents the results for the Tobit estimation. In the 
context of motivation, as we hypothesized, objectives 
related to competitive reaction or preemption are positively 
related to delays in product introduction (p = .016). Contrary 
to the proposed hypothesis, motivations related to the con- 
trol of cannibalization are also positively related to delay 
(p = .035). We advance explanations for this unexpected 
finding in the "Discussion" section. In the context of oppor- 
tunity, we find that delays are reduced when the firm is dom- 
inant in its market (p = .084) and when partner power is high 
(p = .083). Finally, in the context of ability, as we hypothe- 
sized, greater product innovativeness is positively associated 
with delay (p = .04), whereas greater interfunctional coordi- 
nation and a higher level of top management emphasis on 
timely introduction are negatively associated with delay (p = 
.000 and p = .016, respectively). 
Discussion and Implications 
This article addresses the question, Conditional on a prean- 
nouncement being made, how must an outside observer eval- 
uate a firm's preannounced product introduction deadline? 
We demonstrate that to answer this question, factors related to 
(1) the firm's motivations to delay the product, (2) the pres- 
ence or absence of opportunities to delay the product, and (3) 
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TABLE 2 
Factors Contributing to Product Introduction Delay: Tobit Results 
Predictors 
(Constant) 
Competitive objectives (H1) 
Controlling cannibalization (H2) 
Market dominance (H3) 
Partner power (H4) 
Product innovativeness (H5) 
Interfunctional coordination (H6) 































Notes: N = 113. Positive delay: N = 80 (70.8%), Schwarz Bayesian information criterion = 334.96, and log-likelihood = -316.05. 
the firm's ability to deliver the product on time must be con- 
sidered. We discuss our findings next, beginning with the 
unexpected finding that increased cannibalization potential is 
associated with increased delay in product introduction. 
Findings 
The positive link between cannibalization potential and 
increased delay. When a new product that is expected to 
replace an existing product is preannounced, customers 
anticipating the former will postpone purchases of the latter. 
Ostensibly, managers who seek to avoid such delayed sales 
will strive to introduce the new product on time. Contrary to 
our hypothesis, though, we find that increased potential for 
cannibalization is associated with increased delay in product 
introduction beyond preannounced deadlines. 
The following explanations are consistent with our find- 
ing. First, when existing products are performing well, man- 
agers may seek to postpone the uncertainty caused by their 
replacement with new, relatively untested products. Such an 
aversion to the potential downsides of replacement may be 
more pronounced as the product introduction deadline 
approaches. Increased aversion of this kind to potential losses 
in the short run is consistent with the behavioral phenomenon 
of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler 1999). 
Second, the new product may present a less attractive 
profit proposition because it may (1) involve higher variable 
costs than anticipated and thus cannot quickly reap economies 
of scale in production; (2) involve substantial unforeseen 
expenditures related to advertising, consumer education, and 
other aspects of information dissemination; and (3) need to be 
priced lower than expected to penetrate the market suffi- 
ciently even while embedding more sophisticated and expen- 
sive materials and technologies. Managers and design engi- 
neers who supervise early stages of product development 
often focus more on issues related to innovation and technol- 
ogy and do not pay adequate attention to the overall economic 
case for product development. Furthermore, while focusing 
on the product under development, managers may tend to 
ignore firm-level costs and implications related to the product 
line and customer mix (Kaplan 1990). 
The economic disadvantages, both perceived and real, 
associated with switching to the new product are clarified 
and magnified as the product introduction deadline 
approaches. Under these conditions, the existing product 
increasingly takes on the characteristics of a relatively safe 
bet. In response, managers tend to delay the new product 
and treat it as an option, to be exercised at an appropriate 
time in the future. On the basis of these arguments, and con- 
sistent with the argument of Christensen (1997), established 
firms might fear cannibalization and thus delay the intro- 
duction of new technologies. 
These arguments are supported by firms' real-world 
experiences. For example, fearing cannibalization, IBM 
often delayed or otherwise stymied innovative technologies 
and products that were ready for market entry (McGrath 
2001). Although IBM developed reduced instruction set 
computing technology, it delayed implementing it and lost 
ground to competing computer makers. Likewise, IBM 
intentionally reduced the capabilities of PCjr to avoid canni- 
balizing the personal computer market. Similarly, in the 
early 1980s, IBM hesitated to push into desktop computers 
and workstations because it feared losing business on its 
high-margin mainframe computers. This was a lapse of 
great consequence that opened up the markets to new and 
aggressive competitors, a lapse that hurts IBM to this day. 
Among the considered antecedents to product delay, note 
that such aversion to risk associated with the replacement of 
the tested and familiar with the new and unfamiliar is in a 
direction opposite to the stated hypothesis and works in favor 
of increased delay in the case of fear of cannibalization. 
Among other antecedents, consistent with the corresponding 
hypotheses, such aversion to risk, in general, works in favor 
of a timely introduction of the preannounced product. For 
example, managers who are averse to risk would work toward 
a timely introduction when they fear scrutiny on account of 
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market dominance, are apprehensive of backlash from partner 
firms, or seek to keep top management satisfied.? 
Findings related to the MOA framework. The results 
suggest that to obtain a relatively complete accounting of 
factors that delay preannounced products, factors related to 
each element of the MOA framework must be considered. 
First, in the context of motivation, not every preannounce- 
ment is backed up with honest intentions. For example, 
firms may not intend to fulfill NPPAs when they seek to pro- 
tect the substantial cash inflow from existing products or 
when they announce a new product to react to or preempt a 
competitor. Second, constraints from the strategic partners 
and the environment can discipline the announcing firm's 
product introduction plans and increase the likelihood of 
timely introduction. Third, some delays in product introduc- 
tion may derive from the true inability of the announcing 
firm to uphold its promises made in good faith. For exam- 
ple, the challenges encountered in the development of inno- 
vative products are difficult to anticipate ex ante and can be 
underestimated in the excitement and can-do spirit associ- 
ated with new product and NPPA activity. 
Managerial and Policy Implications 
The findings offer guidelines for outside observers who seek 
to evaluate NPPAs, for managers who design NPPAs, and 
for policy planners who seek to reduce the anticompetitive 
effects of product-introduction delays beyond preannounced 
deadlines. 
NPAA evaluation. From the perspective of an outside 
observer, a blind acceptance of product introduction dead- 
lines in an NPPA can prove a costly mistake; many compa- 
nies have suffered substantial financial losses while waiting 
for preannounced products, and some have gone out of busi- 
ness while doing so. In response, though, observers of 
NPPAs in the field have tended to smother all NPPAs in a 
blanket of suspicion and to develop rather rough heuristics 
to deal with the problem. For example, consider the reaction 
of a senior information technology manager (Brandel 1994, 
p. 14): "Always wait until Version 1.1 or 1.2[;]... the soft- 
ware version that ends with .0 is always deadly." 
When outside observers integrate information about the 
factors related to all components of the MOA triad as 
demarcated in this study, they are in a better position to 
interpret and evaluate NPPAs and to arrive at more informed 
conclusions about how they should react. 
However, before evaluating the NPPA, outside observers 
must develop a keen understanding of the conditions that 
lead to the predictors themselves. For example, consider the 
ability of partners to punish the announcing firm. This abil- 
ity might depend on the level of mutually embedded assets 
that the firm and the partners possess (the greater such 
embeddedness, the lesser is the ability of a partner to walk 
?Dominant firms may be less willing to delay preannounced 
products to avoid cannibalizing existing offerings; that is, the 
degree of dominance may moderate the estimated positive rela- 
tionship between fear of cannibalization and introduction delay. Ex 
post, we estimated a Tobit model with an interaction term to 
explore for such a moderating effect. Although the interaction term 
was not significant, this moderating effect deserves closer attention 
in further esearch. 
away and thus the lower is its ability to punish), the avail- 
ability of other partners to switch to, and the degree to which 
product standards compel the partners to stick with the 
announcing firm. After considering such conditions that 
relate to the predictors, observers can meaningfully judge 
the salience of each predictor in a specific context. 
When a high probability of delay is associated with an 
NPPA, observers can take steps in response. As we subse- 
quently describe, these steps vary according to whether the 
observers are managers in partner or complementor firms, 
managers in competing firms, or customers. 
Managers in partner or complementor firms are primarily 
concerned with reducing their exposure to delay. First, these 
managers can avoid overcommitment by defensively sched- 
uling projects that embed the preannounced product. Second, 
they can seek more credible commitments for skeletal ver- 
sions of the product from the announcing firm: These ver- 
sions may deliver lower functionality but can be introduced 
in a shorter time frame. Third, they can coordinate with other 
partner firms to emphasize collectively the importance of 
meeting promised deadlines to the announcing firm. Finally, 
in the absence of other recourse, they can plan around the 
preannounced product or switch to competing products. 
Managers in competing firms are primarily concerned 
with designing their business strategies to accommodate the 
moves of the announcing firm. When these managers estimate 
that the focal firm is not likely to adhere to a promised prod- 
uct introduction deadline, they must avoid the tendency to 
overreact. This does not imply that they must take no actions 
in response to the NPPA; rather, the nature and degree of their 
response must be carefully calibrated to accommodate the 
likelihood that the preannounced product either may be sig- 
nificantly delayed or may not even materialize. For example, 
these managers may proceed with plans for developing a 
competing product to an extent, thus leaving further develop- 
ment and launch as options to be potentially invoked as the 
announcing firm clarifies its plans and intentions. 
A customer evaluating an NPPA can choose between 
adopting an existing product of the announcing firm (or of a 
competitor) and postponing the adoption decision (in which 
case either the preannounced product or any other product 
can be adopted at some future point). Much as complemen- 
tor and partner firms do, customers must develop contin- 
gency plans in case the preannounced product is delayed 
and/or an appropriate substitute is unavailable. Furthermore, 
customers must be particularly careful to avoid the sunk- 
cost fallacy (i.e., a long wait for a preannounced product 
must not be used to justify a decision to wait even longer). 
Instead, customers must dispassionately evaluate the costs 
and benefits of waiting longer at periodic intervals. 
Designing an NPPA. From the perspective of managers in 
the announcing firm, the results draw attention to conditions 
that can hinder the implementation of NPPAs according to 
preannounced deadlines. For example, managers must think 
twice before instinctively reacting to competitors' NPPAs or 
aggressively preempting their forthcoming initiatives. It may 
be tempting to forestall customer migration to the competitor 
in the short run, but such a move may have significant nega- 
tive consequences in the long run, including dilution of the 
firm's marketplace credibility. Likewise, even at an early 
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stage of product development, managers must carefully eval- 
uate whether they are ready to cannibalize a profitable, well- 
established product with a new product that may be techno- 
logically advanced but offers risky market prospects and is 
less profitable on a per-unit basis. In addition, management 
should act more conservatively when deciding on introduc- 
tion times for highly innovative products. 
Policy implications. Although there may exist some pol- 
icy benefits of ensuring that all new products are introduced 
according to preannounced deadlines, the delays that raise 
the greatest antitrust and anticompetitive concerns are those 
that are intentional or strategic (these broadly correspond to 
the motivation aspect of our analysis). However, as is shown 
in Appendix B, it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish 
between strategic and innocent delays. There is an intense 
debate in the policy arena about whether all substantial 
delays in preannounced products should be treated equally 
under antitrust law, regardless of the announcer's intent 
(much like deceptive advertising under the Lanham Act). 
Our findings serve as a reminder that to arrive at a fair and 
balanced evaluation of delays in preannounced products, 
factors related to opportunity and ability must be considered 
in parallel with those related to motivation. 
Limitations and Further Research 
First, although we believe that we targeted the correct key 
informants and that the informants provided relatively can- 
did responses, extension of the analysis with independently 
collected information might lead to even greater confidence 
in the results. Second, our set of key explanatory variables is 
not exhaustive. For example, researchers might consider 
variables that represent customer power, development team 
motivation, and team leadership quality. Whereas problems 
with measurement inhibited the consideration of customer 
power in the current analysis, this variable must figure in 
further research. Third, the scales used must be refined and 
expanded in further research. This is particularly true for the 
scale that measures partner power, which currently com- 
prises only two items. Fourth, we focused on a subset of 
high-technology industries to reduce interindustry con- 
founds. The study can be replicated in other settings. 
The following three themes present particularly worth- 
while research opportunities in the area: First is an explana- 
tion of the entire timeline of NPPA-related activities. In 
communicating with the marketplace in the context of new 
product development, managers must decide (1) when the 
NPPA should be made (i.e., the preannouncement date), (2) 
the gap between the preannouncement date and the 
promised product introduction date (i.e., the preannounced 
lead time), and (3) the actual time of product introduction 
(this may partly be driven by factors outside of the man- 
agers' control). A single model that considers the drivers of 
each of these decisions and the relationships between these 
decisions appears to be an appropriate next step. 
Second is management of the release of information 
related to new product development. Little is known about 
how a firm should manage the entire process of information 
exchange with the marketplace during the product develop- 
ment process. For example, when and how must manage- 
ment inform the marketplace about delays on an ongoing 
basis? Such an incremental approach might help the firm 
better manage the expectations of various constituencies 
and, in turn, help it manage its own plans to accommodate 
such delays. Furthermore, the design of innovative NPPAs 
deserves attention. For example, NPPAs could provide a dis- 
tribution of probabilities over a range of potential introduc- 
tion times, as opposed to a single deadline. 
Third is the establishment of the timeliness-quality 
trade-off. Because product introductions tend to be well- 
defined public acts, research has focused on issues related to 
the timing of new product initiatives. However, firms can 
often trade off timeliness against quality (e.g., it may be pos- 
sible to introduce a product of marginal quality on time). 
When the focus is solely on introduction timing, the issue of 
what is being introduced into the marketplace is overlooked. 
The relationships among NPPA deadlines, product introduc- 
tion timing, and product quality require closer examination; 
a focus on timing alone tells but part of the story. 
APPENDIX A 
Construct Items and Reliability 
Construct Scale Items Source 
Competitive 
objectives 
a = .79 
Controlling 
cannibalization 
a = .70 
1. One objective of our last new product preannouncement was to 
respond to or to preempt a competitor's 
announcement/introduction of a new product. 
2. One objective of our last new product preannouncement was to 
discourage customers from switching to a competitor's product. 
3. Our last new product preannouncement was not related to 
competitors' new product introduction activity or plans. (reverse 
coded) 
1. The sale of the preannounced new product may come from three 
sources: (1) sales replacing our existing products, (2) sales 
displacing our competitors' products, and (3) sales from new 
customers. Please estimate the percentage of the new product 
sales that was expected to come from a replacement of the 
existing product sales. 
2. The preannounced product was expected to greatly reduce the 
cash inflow from our existing products. 
New scale. 
Item 1 is adopted from 
Kohli (1999). 
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APPENDIX A 
Continued 
Construct Scale Items Source 
Market dominance 
a = .78 
Partner power 
a = .67 
Product 
innovativeness 
a = .78 
Interfunctional 
coordination 
a = .75 
Top management 
emphasis 




a = .75 
Market uncertainty 
(control) 
a = .73 
3. For the preannounced product, the possibility that customers might 
delay purchases of existing products was a serious concern. 
1. Perceived dominance within the product category. 
2. Perceived leadership within the product category. 
3. Product category market share relative to that of the top four 
players. 
1. Our complementors will need to rely on us in the future even if our 
relationship is not on the best terms. (reverse coded) 
2. Our complementors are very dependent on our product to serve 
their customers. (reverse coded) 
1. The preannounced product included innovative product features. 
2. High-quality technological innovations were embedded in the 
preannounced product. 
3. Compared to similar products developed by our competitors, the 
preannounced product offered unique features/attributes/benefits 
to customers. 
4. In terms of the embedded technology, the preannounced product 
was substantially more innovative compared to existing products 
available in the market. 
5. The preannounced product was only a minor product 
improvement/modification over existing products available in the 
market. (reverse coded) 
1. The activities of the different functions are well coordinated. 
2. Management teams from different functions feel that the goals of 
their respective functional groups are in harmony with one another. 
3. We share resources with other functional units within the 
organization. 
4. Functional units in our organization often blame each other when 
products fail. (reverse coded) 
1. Top managers emphasize that delivering a new product on time is 
key to product success. 
2. Top managers clearly communicate the message that failure to 
deliver preannounced product on time causes great harm to the 
company's reputation and image. 
3. Top managers emphasize that we will not announce a product 
unless we are confident that it will be launched on time. 
4. Top managers here generally tolerate product delays well. (reverse 
coded) 
5. Delivering a product within the preannounced time frame is a top 
priority for our senior managers. 
1. In this product category, technology is changing rapidly. 
2. In this product category, technological changes provide big 
opportunities. 
3. In this product category, a large number of product ideas have 
been made possible through technological breakthroughs. 
4. In this product category, technological developments are rather 
minor. (reverse coded) 
Indicate how quickly the following factors change: 
1. Customers' preferences for product features 
2. Competitors' selling strategies 
3. Competitors' products and models 
4. Competitors' product pricing 
5. Competitors' promotion/advertising strategies 
Items 1 and 2 are 
adopted and Item 3 is 
adapted from Eliashberg 
and Robertson (1988). 
New scale. 
Items 1, 2, 3, and 5 are 
adapted from Sarin and 
Mahajan (2001). 
Item 2 is adopted from 
Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993). Item 3 is 
adopted from Narver 
and Slater (1990). 
New scale. 
Adopted from Jaworski 
and Kohli (1993) 
Items 1, 2, 3, and 5 are 
adopted from Maltz and 
Kohli (1996). 
Notes: Except for Item 1 in the product cannibalization scale, we measured all items on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = "strongly disagree" 
and 7 = "strongly agree"). 
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Appendix B 
When Is a Delayed Product 
Vaporware? 
Vaporware has been variously defined as the occurrence of 
substantial product introduction delays, the absence of 
promised features, or even the belief that a preannounced 
product will never ship. However, the most common inter- 
pretation of vaporware pertains to the intent to deceive on 
the part of the announcing firm. Vaporware is controversial 
precisely because of this; in the absence of a smoking gun 
(e.g., a transcript of internal meetings or an exchange of e- 
mail) that captures such intent, the occurrence of vaporware 
is difficult to prove. As Prentice (1996, p. 1175) argues, 
delays in NPPA fulfillment may be perfectly innocent and 
are to be expected: 
Of course, not all of the products will meet projected intro- 
duction dates. Others may not carry all the promised fea- 
tures. Others may not see the light of day. After all, the 
design, testing, and manufacturing of high-tech products is 
a very complicated business. Many projects are so very 
complex that it is nearly impossible to know when all the 
glitches will be worked out. Not all delays are foreseeable. 
Not all broken promises are broken intentionally. 
In the proposed MOA framework, the variables related to 
motivation are the ones that are most likely to be associated 
with vaporware. However, even when variables related to 
motivation are relevant and must be accommodated by an 
outside manager in evaluating an NPPA, it is difficult to 
prove intent to mislead in a court of law. To prove such intent, 
it is not sufficient to demonstrate, for example, that the NPPA 
was made in reaction to an announcement from a competitor. 
Instead, it must be demonstrated that the information in the 
NPPA was not merely a reflection of the honest, if overam- 
bitious, intentions of the announcing firm but that the NPPA 
was explicitly designed for anticompetitive purposes. 
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